Topics in Reinforcement Learning: AlphaZero, ChatGPT, Neuro-Dynamic Programming, Model Predictive Control, Discrete Optimization, Applications Arizona State University Course CSE 691, Spring 2025

Links to Class Notes, Videolectures, and Slides at http://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/RLbook.html<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Kim Hammar (khammar1@asu.edu), Prof. Dimitri P. Bertsekas (dimitrib@mit.edu), and Dr. Yuchao Li (yuchaoli@asu.edu)

# Guest Lecture

Approximation in Value Space using Aggregation, with Applications to POMDPs and Cybersecurity

<sup>1</sup>Dimitri P. Bertsekas. A Course in Reinforcement Learning. 2nd edition: Athema Scientific, 2025. E - a a a statement of the statement of the



#### The Aggregation Methodology

- Combine groups of similar states into aggregate states.
- Formulate an aggregate dynamic programming problem based on these states.
- Solve the aggregate problem using some computational method.
- Use the solution to the aggregate problem to compute a cost function approximation for the original problem.

### Aggregation is A Form of Problem Simplification



#### The Aggregation Methodology

- Combine groups of similar states into aggregate states.
- G Formulate an aggregate dynamic programming problem based on these states.
- Solve the aggregate problem using some computational method.
- Use the solution to the aggregate problem to compute a cost function approximation for the original problem.

### Aggregation is A Form of Problem Simplification



#### The Aggregation Methodology

- Combine groups of similar states into aggregate states.
- Is Formulate an aggregate dynamic programming problem based on these states.
- Solve the aggregate problem using some computational method.
- Use the solution to the aggregate problem to compute a cost function approximation for the original problem.

### Aggregation is A Form of Problem Simplification



#### The Aggregation Methodology

- Combine groups of similar states into aggregate states.
- I Formulate an aggregate dynamic programming problem based on these states.
- Solve the aggregate problem using some computational method.
- Use the solution to the aggregate problem to compute a cost function approximation for the original problem.

• • • • • • • • • •

#### Aggregation with Representative States

- **Example:** Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs
- General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

э

イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト



- Aggregation with Representative States
- **2** Example: Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs
- General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

э

(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)



- Aggregation with Representative States
- **2** Example: Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs
- General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

э

(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)



- Aggregation with Representative States
- **2** Example: Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs
- General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

э

• • • • • • • • • • • •

- State space:  $X = \{1, ..., n\}$ , states are denoted by i, j.
- Control constraint set: U(i).
- Cost of transitioning from state *i* to *j* given control *u*: g(i, u, j).
- Cost-to-go from state i: J(i).
- **Discount** factor:  $\alpha$ .
- Probability of transitioning from state *i* to *j* given control *u*:  $p_{ij}(u)$ .
  - Equivalent formulation:  $x_{k+1} = f(x_k, u_k, w_k)$ .

$$(i) \xrightarrow{p_{ij}(u), g(i, u, j)} (j)$$

• • • • • • • • • • •

- Introduce a subset A of the original states  $1, \ldots, n$ , called representative states.
- We use *i*, *j* to denote original states and *x*, *y* to denote representative states.



- For each state *i* we define aggregation probabilities  $\{\phi_{ix} \mid x \in A\}$ .
- Intuitively,  $\phi_{ix}$  expresses similarity between states *i* and *x*, where  $\phi_{xx} = 1$ .



6/39

Image: A matrix



イロト イヨト イヨト

- State space:  $\mathcal{A}$  (the set of representative states).

$$\hat{p}_{xy}(u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u) \phi_{ji},$$
 for all representative states  $(x, y)$  and controls  $u$ ,

$$\hat{g}(x,u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u)g(x,u,i)$$



- State space:  $\mathcal{A}$  (the set of representative states).
- Control constraint set: U(i) (the original control constraint set).

$$\hat{p}_{xy}(u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u)\phi_{ji},$$
 for all representative states  $(x, y)$  and controls  $u$ ,

$$\hat{g}(x,u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u)g(x,u,i)$$



- State space: A (the set of representative states).
- Control constraint set: U(i) (the original control constraint set).
- Transition probabilities and costs

$$\hat{p}_{xy}(u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u) \phi_{ji},$$
 for all representative states  $(x, y)$  and controls  $u$ ,

$$\hat{g}(x,u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u)g(x,u,i)$$

for all representative states x and controls u.



- State space:  $\mathcal{A}$  (the set of representative states).
- Control constraint set: U(i) (the original control constraint set).
- Transition probabilities and costs

$$\hat{p}_{xy}(u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u)\phi_{ji},$$
 for all representative states  $(x, y)$  and controls  $u$ ,

$$\hat{g}(x,u) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{xi}(u)g(x,u,i)$$

for all representative states x and controls u.



- The aggregate problem can be solved "exactly" using dynamic programming/simulation.
- The optimal cost from a representative state x in this problem is denoted by  $r_x^*$ .



### Cost Difference Between the Aggregate and Original Problems

- The aggregate cost function  $r_x^*$  is only defined for representative states  $x \in A$ .
- The optimal cost function  $J^*(i)$  is defined for the entire state space i = 1, ..., n.
- For a representative state x, we generally have  $r_x^* \neq J^*(x)$ .



## Cost Difference Between the Aggregate and Original Problems

- The aggregate cost function  $r_x^*$  is only defined for representative states  $x \in A$ .
- The optimal cost function  $J^*(i)$  is defined for the entire state space i = 1, ..., n.
- For a representative state x, we generally have  $r_x^* \neq J^*(x)$ .



(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)

### Using the Aggregate Solution to Approximate the Original Problem

• We obtain an approximate cost function  $\tilde{J}$  for the original problem via interpolation:

$$\tilde{J}(i) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \phi_{ix} r_x^*, \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

• Using this cost function, we can obtain a one-step lookahead policy:

$$\mu(i) \in \arg\min_{u \in U(i)} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(u) \left( g(i, u, j) + \alpha \tilde{J}(j) \right) \right\}, \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$



### Using the Aggregate Solution to Approximate the Original Problem

• We obtain an approximate cost function  $\tilde{J}$  for the original problem via interpolation:

$$\tilde{J}(i) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \phi_{ix} r_x^*, \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

• Using this cost function, we can obtain a one-step lookahead policy:

$$\mu(i) \in \underset{u \in U(i)}{\arg\min} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(u) \left( g(i, u, j) + \alpha \tilde{J}(j) \right) \right\}, \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$



### Using the Aggregate Solution to Approximate the Original Problem

#### Approximating the Original Problem

• We obtain an approximate cost function  $\hat{J}$  for the original problem via **interpolation**:

$$ilde{J}(j) = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{A}} \phi_{jy} r_y^*, \qquad \qquad j = 1, \dots, n$$

• Using this cost function, we can obtain a one-step lookahead policy:

#### What is the difference between the approximation $\tilde{J}$ and the optimal cost function $J^*$ ?



# Hard Aggregation

• Consider the case where  $\phi_{jy} = 0$  for all representative states x except one.

• Let  $S_x$  denote the set of states that aggregate to the representative state x. • i.e., the *footprint* of x, where  $\{1, \ldots, n\} = \bigcup_{x \in A} S_x$ .



イロト イヨト イヨト イヨ

# Hard Aggregation

- Consider the case where  $\phi_{jy} = 0$  for all representative states x except one.
- Let  $S_x$  denote the set of states that aggregate to the representative state x.
  - i.e., the *footprint* of x, where  $\{1, \ldots, n\} = \bigcup_{x \in \mathcal{A}} S_x$ .



(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)

### Structure of the Cost Function Approximation

• In the case of hard aggregation,  $\tilde{J}(i) = \sum_{x \in A} \phi_{ix} r_x^* = r_y^*$  for all  $i \in S_y$ . • Hence,  $\tilde{J}$  is piecewise constant.



### Structure of the Cost Function Approximation

- In the case of hard aggregation,  $\tilde{J}(i) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \phi_{ix} r_x^* = r_y^*$  for all  $i \in S_y$ .
- Hence,  $\tilde{J}$  is piecewise constant.



#### Structure of the Cost Function Approximation

- In the case of hard aggregation,  $\tilde{J}(i) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \phi_{ix} r_x^* = r_y^*$  for all  $i \in S_y$ .
- Hence,  $\tilde{J}$  is piecewise constant.



13/39

#### Approximation Error Bound in the Case of Hard Aggregation

• Let  $\epsilon$  be the maximum variation of  $J^*$  within a footprint set  $S_x$ , i.e.,

$$\epsilon = \max_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \max_{i,j \in \mathcal{S}_x} |J^*(i) - J^*(j)|.$$

- We refer to the difference  $|J^*(i) \tilde{J}(i)|$  as the approximation error.

$$|J^*(i) - \tilde{J}(i)| \le \frac{\epsilon}{1-\alpha}$$
  $i = 1, \dots, n.$ 



#### Approximation Error Bound in the Case of Hard Aggregation

• Let  $\epsilon$  be the maximum variation of  $J^*$  within a footprint set  $S_x$ , i.e.,

$$\epsilon = \max_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \max_{i,j \in S_x} |J^*(i) - J^*(j)|.$$

- We refer to the difference  $|J^*(i) \tilde{J}(i)|$  as the approximation error.
- This error is bounded as

$$|J^*(i) - \tilde{J}(i)| \leq \frac{\epsilon}{1-lpha}$$
  $i = 1, \ldots, n.$ 

• Takeway: choose the footprint sets so that  $\epsilon$  is small.





Aggregation with Representative States

#### **@** Example: Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs

- General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

э

14/39

イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト

- State space  $X = \{1, ..., n\}$ , observation space Z, and control constraint set U(i).
- Each state transition (i, j) generates a cost g(i, u, j);
- and an observation z with probability  $p(z \mid j, u)$ .
- Let b(i) denote the conditional probability that the state is i, given the history.
- The belief state is defined as  $b = (b(1), b(2), \dots, b(n))$ .
- The belief *b* is updated using a **belief estimator** *F*(*b*, *u*, *z*).
- Goal: Find a policy as a function of b that minimizes the cost.



- State space  $X = \{1, ..., n\}$ , observation space Z, and control constraint set U(i).
- Each state transition (*i*, *j*) generates a cost *g*(*i*, *u*, *j*);
- and an observation z with probability p(z | j, u).
- Let b(i) denote the conditional probability that the state is *i*, given the history.
- The belief state is defined as  $b = (b(1), b(2), \dots, b(n))$ .
- The belief b is updated using a belief estimator F(b, u, z).
- Goal: Find a policy as a function of b that minimizes the cost.



- State space  $X = \{1, ..., n\}$ , observation space Z, and control constraint set U(i).
- Each state transition (*i*, *j*) generates a cost *g*(*i*, *u*, *j*);
- and an observation z with probability  $p(z \mid j, u)$ .
- Let b(i) denote the conditional probability that the state is *i*, given the history.
- The belief state is defined as  $b = (b(1), b(2), \dots, b(n))$ .
- The belief b is updated using a **belief estimator** F(b, u, z).
- Goal: Find a policy as a function of b that minimizes the cost.



- State space  $X = \{1, ..., n\}$ , observation space Z, and control constraint set U(i).
- Each state transition (*i*, *j*) generates a cost *g*(*i*, *u*, *j*);
- and an observation z with probability  $p(z \mid j, u)$ .
- Let b(i) denote the conditional probability that the state is *i*, given the history.
- The belief state is defined as  $b = (b(1), b(2), \dots, b(n))$ .
- The belief b is updated using a **belief estimator** F(b, u, z).
- Goal: Find a policy as a function of b that minimizes the cost.



- The belief *b* resides in the belief space *B*, i.e., the n-1 dimensional unit simplex.
- For example, if the states are  $\{0,1\}$ , then  $b \in [0,1]$ .


• We can obtain representative beliefs via uniform discretization of the belief space:

$$\mathcal{A} = \left\{ b \mid b \in B, b(i) = rac{k_i}{
ho}, \sum_{i=1}^n k_i = 
ho, k_i \in \{0, \dots, 
ho\} 
ight\},$$

where  $\rho$  serves as the discretization resolution.



#### • We can implement hard aggregation via the nearest neighbor mapping:

 $\phi_{by} = 1$  if and only if y is the nearest neighbor of b, where  $b \in B$  and  $y \in A$ .



・ロト ・日 ・ ・ ヨ ・ ・

- Problem: rover exploration on Mars to find "good" rocks with high scientific value.

- The rover stops the mission by moving to the right, yielding an exit-cost of -10.



#### Rocksample (4, 3)

Kim Hammar

Approximation by Aggregation

2 April, 2025

- Problem: rover exploration on Mars to find "good" rocks with high scientific value.
- $\bullet\,$  There are 3 rocks on a 4  $\times\,$  4 grid. The rover does not know which rocks are good.
- The controls (north, south, east, west) moves the rover (at cost 0.1).
- The control "sampling" determines the rock quality at the rover position (cost 10 for sampling a bad rock and cost -10 for sampling a good rock).
- Control "check-I" applies a sensor to check the quality of rock / (at cost 1).
- Accuracy of the sensor decreases exponentially with Euclidean distance to the rock.
- The rover stops the mission by moving to the right, yielding an exit-cost of -10.



Kim Hammar

Approximation by Aggregation

2 April, 2025

- Problem: rover exploration on Mars to find "good" rocks with high scientific value.
- There are 3 rocks on a  $4 \times 4$  grid. The rover does not know which rocks are good.
- The controls (north, south, east, west) moves the rover (at cost 0.1).

- The rover stops the mission by moving to the right, yielding an exit-cost of -10.



#### Rocksample (4, 3)

- Problem: rover exploration on Mars to find "good" rocks with high scientific value.
- There are 3 rocks on a  $4 \times 4$  grid. The rover does not know which rocks are good.
- The controls (north, south, east, west) moves the rover (at cost 0.1).
- The control "sampling" determines the rock quality at the rover position (cost 10 for sampling a bad rock and cost -10 for sampling a good rock).

- The rover stops the mission by moving to the right, yielding an exit-cost of -10.



#### Rocksample (4, 3)

Kim Hammar

Approximation by Aggregation

2 April, 2025

- Problem: rover exploration on Mars to find "good" rocks with high scientific value.
- $\bullet\,$  There are 3 rocks on a 4  $\times\,$  4 grid. The rover does not know which rocks are good.
- The controls (north, south, east, west) moves the rover (at cost 0.1).
- The control "sampling" determines the rock quality at the rover position (cost 10 for sampling a bad rock and cost -10 for sampling a good rock).
- Control "check-I" applies a sensor to check the quality of rock / (at cost 1).
- Accuracy of the sensor decreases exponentially with Euclidean distance to the rock.
- The rover stops the mission by moving to the right, yielding an exit-cost of -10.



Kim Hammar

Approximation by Aggregation

2 April, 2025

- Problem: rover exploration on Mars to find "good" rocks with high scientific value.
- There are 3 rocks on a  $4 \times 4$  grid. The rover does not know which rocks are good.
- The controls (north, south, east, west) moves the rover (at cost 0.1).
- The control "sampling" determines the rock quality at the rover position (cost 10 for sampling a bad rock and cost -10 for sampling a good rock).
- Control "check-I" applies a sensor to check the quality of rock / (at cost 1).
- Accuracy of the sensor decreases exponentially with Euclidean distance to the rock.
- The rover stops the mission by moving to the right, yielding an exit-cost of -10.



# Approximating Rocksample (4,3) via Representative Aggregation

- The Rocksample (4,3) POMDP has a 127-dimensional belief space.
- We discretize the belief space with three different resolutions:
  - $\rho = 1$  leads to an aggregate problem with 128 representative beliefs.
  - $\triangleright \ \rho = 2$  leads to an aggregate problem with 8256 representative beliefs.
  - $\triangleright$   $\rho=3$  leads to an aggregate problem with 357760 representative beliefs.





イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト

# Approximating Rocksample (4,3) via Representative Aggregation

- The Rocksample (4,3) POMDP has a 127-dimensional belief space.
- We discretize the belief space with three different resolutions:
  - $\rho = 1$  leads to an aggregate problem with 128 representative beliefs.
  - $\rho = 2$  leads to an aggregate problem with 8256 representative beliefs.
  - ▶  $\rho = 3$  leads to an aggregate problem with 357760 representative beliefs.



#### Aggregation Methodology

The representative beliefs define an aggregate dynamic programming problem, which we solve using value iteration to obtain  $\tilde{J}$ . We then use  $\tilde{J}$  to obtain a one-step lookahead policy as

$$\mu(b) \in \arg\min_{u \in U(i)} \left\{ \hat{g}(b, u) + \alpha \sum_{z \in Z} \hat{p}(z \mid b, u) \tilde{J}(F(b, u, z)) \right\}, \ b \in B.$$

# Animation Setup

Rocksample (4, 3)



# Animation Setup

Rocksample (4, 3)



< □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □</li>
 2 April, 2025

# Animation Setup

Rocksample (4, 3)



< □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □</li>
 2 April, 2025



イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト



イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト



イロト イヨト イヨト イヨト

#### Computational Trade-Offs

- The animations show that performance improves with the discretization resolution  $\rho$ .
- This is not surprising. One can show that  $\lim_{\rho\to\infty} ||J^* \tilde{J}|| = 0$ .
- However, the computational complexity increases with the resolution  $\rho$ .



21/39

Image: A matrix

#### Computational Trade-Offs

- The animations show that performance improves with the discretization resolution *ρ*.
- This is not surprising. One can show that  $\lim_{\rho\to\infty} \|J^*-\tilde{J}\|=0.$
- However, the computational complexity increases with the resolution  $\rho$ .



21/39

Image: A matrix

- The animations show that performance improves with the discretization resolution *ρ*.
- This is not surprising. One can show that  $\lim_{
  ho o \infty} \|J^* \tilde{J}\| = 0.$
- However, the computational complexity increases with the resolution  $\rho$ .



21/39

A D > < 
 A P >
 A

- The animations show that performance improves with the discretization resolution  $\rho$ .
- This is not surprising. One can show that  $\lim_{
  ho o \infty} \|J^* \widetilde{J}\| = 0.$
- However, the computational complexity increases with the resolution  $\rho$ .



# Comparison Between Aggregation and Other POMDP Methods

POMDP	States n	Observations $ Z $	Controls $ U $	Discount factor $\alpha$
RS (4,4)	257	2	9	0.95
RS (5,5)	801	2	10	0.95
RS (5,7)	3201	2	12	0.95
RS (7,8)	12545	2	13	0.95
RS (10,10)	102401	2	15	0.95

Table: POMDPs used for the experimental evaluation.

Method	Aggregation	Point-based	Heuristic search	Policy-based	Exact DP
Our method	1				
IP					1
PBVI		1			
SARSOP		1			
POMCP			1		
HSVI			1		
AdaOPS			1		
R-DESPOT			1		
POMCPOW			1		
PPO				1	
PPG				1	

Kim Hammar	Approximation by Aggregation	2 April, 2025	22 / 39

POMDP Method	RS (4,4)	RS (5,5)	RS (5,7)	RS (7,8)	RS (10, 10)
Aggregation	-17.15/2.4	-18.12/125.5	-17.51/189.1	-14.71/202	-11.59/500
IP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
PBVI	-8.24/300	-9.05/300	N/A	N/A	N/A
SARSOP	- <b>17.92</b> /10 <sup>-2</sup>	- <b>19.24</b> /58.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
POMCP	-8.64/1.6	-8.80/1.6	-9.81/1.6	-9.46/1.6	-8.98/1.6
HSVI	- <b>17.92</b> /10 <sup>-2</sup>	- <b>19.24</b> /6.2	-24.69/721.3	N/A	N/A
PPO	-8.57/300	-8.15/300	-8.76/300	-7.35/300	-4.59/1000
PPG	-8.57/300	-8.24/300	-8.76/300	-7.35/300	-4.41/1000
AdaOPS	-16.95/1.6	-17.39/1.6	-16.14/1.6	-15.99/1.6	-15.29/1.6
R-DESPOT	-12.07/1.6	-12.09/1.6	-12.00/1.6	-13.14/1.6	-10.41/1.6
POMCPOW	-8.60/1.6	-8.47/1.6	-8.26/1.6	-8.14/1.6	-7.88/1.6

Table: Evaluation results on the benchmark POMDPs; the first number in each cell is the total discounted cost; the second is the compute time in minutes (online methods were given 1 second planning time per control); cells with N/A indicate cases where a result could not be obtained for computational reasons. RS(m,l) stands for an instance of Rocksample with an  $m \times m$  grid and l rocks.

- Digest the first half of the lecture.
- The next half will cover
  - General aggregation; and
    - a case study of using aggregation for network security.

イロト イ団ト イヨト イヨト



- Aggregation with Representative States
- **2** Example: Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs
- **③** General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

э

(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)

#### General Aggregation: Replace Representative States with Subsets

- Introduce a finite set of aggregate states  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- Each aggregate state  $x \in A$  is associated with a disjoint subset  $I_x \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$ .



Image: A math the second se

#### General Aggregation: Replace Representative States with Subsets

- Introduce a finite set of aggregate states  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- Each aggregate state  $x \in A$  is associated with a disjoint subset  $I_x \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$ .



Image: A math the second se

# General Aggregation: Replace Representative States with Subsets

- Introduce a finite set of aggregate states  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- Each aggregate state  $x \in A$  is associated with a disjoint subset  $I_x \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$ .





State space  $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ 

For each state  $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ , we associate

• aggregation probabilities  $\{\phi_{jx} \mid x \in A\}$ , where  $\phi_{jx} = 1$  for all  $j \in I_x$ .

Kum	2 02	mar
1.1111	ann	mai

æ

イロト イポト イヨト イヨト

#### **Disaggregation** Probabilities



For every *aggregate state*  $x \in A$ , we associate

• disaggregation probabilities  $\{d_{xi} \mid i = 1, ..., n\}$ , where  $d_{xi} = 0$  for all  $i \notin I_x$ .

э

イロト イポト イヨト イヨト

- Similar to the earlier case, the aggregation leads to a dynamic system.
- This system can be understood through the following transition diagram.



#### Dynamic System of General Aggregation

- Similar to the earlier case, the aggregation leads to a dynamic system.
- This system can be understood through the following transition diagram.

Original states

#### How to select the aggregate states?



Kim Hammar	Approximation by Aggregation	2 April, 2025	25 / 39

- Suppose that we have a feature mapping F(i) that maps states into feature vectors.
- The mapping F can be obtained using engineering intuition or deep learning.

• We can then form the aggregate states  $I_x$  by grouping states with similar features.



(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)

- Suppose that we have a feature mapping F(i) that maps states into feature vectors.
- The mapping F can be obtained using engineering intuition or deep learning.
- We can then form the aggregate states  $I_x$  by grouping states with similar features.





- Aggregation with Representative States
- **2** Example: Aggregation with Representative States for POMDPs
- General Aggregation Methodology
- Case study: Aggregation for Cybersecurity

• • • • • • • • • • •

# Traditional/Current Network Security Operations



#### Adaptive Control Methodology for Network Security Operations




















æ

A B > 4
 B > 4
 B



▶ < ∃ > 2 April, 2025

æ

• • • • • • • • • • •



- Mathematically, the problem can be formulated as a POMDP.
- Hidden states: the security status of each network component.
- For example,  $x_k = (x_{k,1}, \ldots, x_{k,M})$ , where
  - M is the number of components.
  - $x_{k,i} = 1$  if component *i* is compromised at stage *k*, 0 otherwise.

Image: A matching of the second se

#### Observations



- The system emits observations in the form of logs, performance metrics, and alerts.
- These observations give partial information about the security of the system.

29/39

< □ > < 同 >

### Controls

Flow control By redirecting traffic, the defender can isolate malicious behavior.



#### Access control

By adjusting resource permissions, defenders can prevent attackers from compromising critical assets.



#### **Replication control**

Replication can ensure that multiple replicas of services remain available even when some are compromised.



#### Cost



- The defender wants to minimize the impact of potential attacks.
- At the same time, the defender wants to maintain operational services to clients.

6 100		
- INITE	dillid	

31/39

• • • • • • • •

#### • Networked system with *M* components.

- Each component can be in two states: 1 (compromised) or 0 (safe).
- Each component logs security alerts *z* in real-time.
- Two controls per component: 1 (recovery) and 0 (wait).
- Compromised components and unnecessary recoveries incur costs.



32 / 39

A B > A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A

#### • Networked system with *M* components.

- Each component can be in two states: 1 (compromised) or 0 (safe).
- Each component logs security alerts z in real-time.
- Two controls per component: 1 (recovery) and 0 (wait).
- Compromised components and unnecessary recoveries incur costs.



32 / 39

A B A A B A A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A

- Networked system with *M* components.
- Each component can be in two states: 1 (compromised) or 0 (safe).
- Each component logs security alerts z in real-time.
- Two controls per component: 1 (recovery) and 0 (wait).
- Compromised components and unnecessary recoveries incur costs.



A B A A B A A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A

#### • Networked system with *M* components.

- Each component can be in two states: 1 (compromised) or 0 (safe).
- Each component logs security alerts z in real-time.
- Two controls per component: 1 (recovery) and 0 (wait).
- Compromised components and unnecessary recoveries incur costs.



#### • Networked system with *M* components.

- Each component can be in two states: 1 (compromised) or 0 (safe).
- Each component logs security alerts z in real-time.
- Two controls per component: 1 (recovery) and 0 (wait).
- Compromised components and unnecessary recoveries incur costs.



Image: A matrix

32 / 39

#### Challenge: Curse of Dimensionality



< □ > < 同 >

- For the networked systems that we consider, the number of (hidden) states is in the order of  $10^{50}$ .
- We manage the computational complexity using feature-based aggregation.



- For the networked systems that we consider, the number of (hidden) states is in the order of  $10^{50}$ .
- We manage the computational complexity using feature-based aggregation.



A B A A B A A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A

## Designing Features for Aggregation

- Consider the infrastructure to the right.
- It comprises 64 components.
- Each component has a binary state:
  - State 1 means compromised.
  - State 0 means safe.
- $\implies 2^{64}$  states.
- $\implies$   $(2^{64} 1)$ -dimensional belief space.



イロト イボト イヨト イヨト

### Designing Features for Aggregation

- Consider the infrastructure to the right.
- It comprises 64 components.
- Each component has a binary state:
  - State 1 means compromised.
  - State 0 means safe.
- $\implies$  2<sup>64</sup> states.
- $\implies$  (2<sup>64</sup> 1)-dimensional belief space.



イロト イヨト イヨト

- We manage the complexity using feature-based aggregation.
- Introduce a set of features  $\mathcal{F}$ .
- For example,  $\mathcal{F} = \{ \text{Infrastructure-compromised} \}.$
- Then we only have 2 feature combinations:
  - Safe
  - 2 Compromised
- $\implies$  1-dimensional belief space.



## Designing Features for Aggregation

- Finer aggregations can be obtained by segmenting the network into zones.
- Let Zone-k represent the compromised state of zone *k*.
- If  $\mathcal{F} = \{$ Zone-1, Zone-2, Zone-3 $\}$ .
- Then we have 8 feature combinations.



A B A A B A A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A
 A

35 / 39

## Designing Features for Aggregation

- If  $\mathcal{F} = \{$ Zone-1, Zone-2, Zone-3, Zone-4 $\}$ .
- Then we have 16 feature combinations.
- etc.
- Discretize the belief space over features into  $\approx 200,000$  representative beliefs.
- → Solve the aggregate problem to obtain the cost-function approximation J̃.
- Use *J* to define a policy μ, e.g., a one-step lookahead policy.



Aggregation allows to control the trade-off between computational cost and performance.

### Animation: Security Policy Obtained From Aggregation



Time step=x, Cost: y, Avg. cost per time step = y, Control:

### Animation: Security Policy Obtained From Aggregation



Time step=x, Cost: y, Avg. cost per time step = y, Control:

# Animation: Security Policy Obtained From Aggregation



• • • • • • • •

## Combining Aggregation with Rollout for On-line Policy Adaptation



Method	Offline/Online compute (min/s)	State estimation	Cost
AGGREGATION	8.5/0.01	PARTICLE FILTER	$61.72 \pm 3.96$
PPO	1000/0.01	LATEST OBSERVATION	$341 \pm 133$
РРО	1000/0.01	PARTICLE FILTER	$326 \pm 116$
PPG	1000/0.01	LATEST OBSERVATION	$328\pm178$
PPG	1000/0.01	PARTICLE FILTER	$312\pm163$
DQN	1000/0.01	LATEST OBSERVATION	$516\pm291$
DQN	1000/0.01	PARTICLE FILTER	$492\pm204$
PPO+ACTION PRUNING	300/0.01	LATEST OBSERVATION	$\textbf{57.45} \pm \textbf{2.44}$
PPO+ACTION PRUNING	300/0.01	PARTICLE FILTER	$56.45 \pm 2.81$
POMCP	0/15	PARTICLE FILTER	$53.08 \pm 3.78$
POMCP	0/30	PARTICLE FILTER	$53.18\pm3.42$
AGGREGATION+ROLLOUT	8.5/14.80	PARTICLE FILTER	$\textbf{37.89} \pm \textbf{1.54}$

Numbers indicate the mean and the standard deviation from 1000 evaluations. We use 427500 representative beliefs, lookahead horizon  $\ell = 2$ , and truncated rollout with horizon m = 20.

(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)

#### Conclusion

#### • Aggregation provides a general methodology for approximate dynamic programming.

- Combine groups of similar states into aggregate states.
- Pormulate an aggregate dynamic programming problem.
- Solve the aggregate problem using some computational method.
- **()** Use the aggregate solution to approximate a solution to the original problem.



6 100	2.5	0.00	2 2 2
- INITI			Idi

(日) (四) (日) (日) (日)

- Dynamic programming for mini-max problems
- Rollout and approximation in value space for mini-max problems
- A meta algorithm for computer chess based on reinforcement learning.

Please review Section 2.12 of the "Course in RL" textbook.

Recommended videolecture (Computer chess with model predictive control and reinforcement learning) at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88LDkHaf1sU.

Image: A math a math

- Dynamic programming for mini-max problems
- Rollout and approximation in value space for mini-max problems
- A meta algorithm for computer chess based on reinforcement learning.

#### Please review Section 2.12 of the "Course in RL" textbook.

Recommended videolecture (Computer chess with model predictive control and reinforcement learning) at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88LDkHaf1sU.

Image: A math a math

- Dynamic programming for mini-max problems
- Rollout and approximation in value space for mini-max problems
- A meta algorithm for computer chess based on reinforcement learning.

Please review Section 2.12 of the "Course in RL" textbook.

Recommended videolecture (Computer chess with model predictive control and reinforcement learning) at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88LDkHaf1sU.

• • • • • • • • • •