Self-learning Systems for Cyber Security¹

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October 15, 2020

¹Kim Hammar and Rolf Stadler. "Finding Effective Security Strategies through Reinforcement Learning and Self-Play". In: International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM 2020) (CNSM 2020). Izmir, Turkey, Nov. 2020.


Game Learning Programs



Challenges: Evolving and Automated Attacks


• Challenges:

- Evolving & automated attacks
- Complex infrastructures



Goal: Automation and Learning

- Challenges
 - Evolving & automated attacks
 - Complex infrastructures
- Our Goal:
 - Automate security tasks
 - Adapt to changing attack methods



Approach: Game Model & Reinforcement Learning

• Challenges:


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• Our Goal:

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Our Approach:

- Model network as Markov Game $\mathcal{M}_G = \langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_N, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{R}_1, \dots \mathcal{R}_N \rangle$
- Compute policies π for $\mathcal{M}_{\textit{G}}$
- Incorporate π in self-learning systems



Related Work

Game-Learning Programs:

- TD-Gammon², AlphaGo Zero³, OpenAl Five etc.
- \implies Impressive empirical results of *RL and self-play*

Network Security:

- Automated threat modeling⁴, automated intrusion detection etc.
- Need for automation and better security tooling

• Game Theory:

- Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach⁵.
- Many security operations involves strategic decision making

²Gerald Tesauro. "TD-Gammon, a Self-Teaching Backgammon Program, Achieves Master-Level Play". In: Neural Comput. 6.2 (Mar. 1994), 215-219. ISSN: 0899-7667. DOI: 10.1162/neco.1994.6.2.215. URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.1994.6.2.215.

³David Silver et al. "Mastering the game of Go without human knowledge". In: Nature 550 (Oct. 2017), pp. 354-. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature24270.

⁴Pontus Johnson, Robert Lagerström, and Mathias Ekstedt, "A Meta Language for Threat Modeling and Attack Simulations", In: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2018. Hamburg, Germany: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018. ISBN: 9781450364485. DOI: 10.1145/3230833.3232799. URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/3230833.3232799.


⁵Tansu Alpcan and Tamer Basar. Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach. 1st. USA: Cambridge University Press. 2010. ISBN: 0521119324.

Outline


- Use Case
- Markov Game Model for Intrusion Prevention
- Reinforcement Learning Problem
- Method
- Results
- Conclusions

Use Case: Intrusion Prevention


- A **Defender** owns a network infrastructure
 - Consists of connected components
 - Components run network services
 - Defends by monitoring and patching
- An Attacker seeks to intrude on the infrastructure
 - Has a partial view of the infrastructure
 - Wants to compromise a specific component
 - Attacks by reconnaissance and exploitation





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


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










(1) Network Infrastructure (2) Graph $\mathcal{G} = \langle \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{E} \rangle$ (3) State space $|\mathcal{S}| = (w+1)^{|\mathcal{N}| \cdot m \cdot (m+1)}$









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
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
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


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





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







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- Markov game
- Zero-sum
- 2 players
- Partially observed
- Stochastic elements
- Round-based
- $\mathcal{M}_{G} = \langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}_{1}, \mathcal{A}_{2}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{R}_{1}, \mathcal{R}_{2}, \gamma, \rho_{0} \rangle$

Automatic Learning of Security Strategies



• Finding strategies for the Markov game model:

- Evolutionary methods
- Computational game theory
- Self-Play Reinforcement learning
 - Attacker vs Defender
 - Strategies evolve without human intervention


Motivation for Reinforcement Learning:

- Strong empirical results in related work
- Can adapt to new attack methods and threats
- Can be used for complex domains that are hard to model exactly

The Reinforcement Learning Problem

Goal:

• Approximate $\pi^* = \arg\max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{T} \gamma^t r_{t+1}\right]$



• Learning Algorithm:

- Represent π by π_{θ}
- Define objective $J(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{o \sim \rho^{\pi_{\theta}}, a \sim \pi_{\theta}}[R]$
- Maximize $J(\theta)$ by stochastic gradient ascent with gradient $\nabla_{\theta}J(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{o \sim \rho^{\pi_{\theta}}, a \sim \pi_{\theta}} \left[\nabla_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta}(a|o) A^{\pi_{\theta}}(o, a) \right]$


Domain-Specific Challenges:

- Partial observability: captured in the model
- Large state space $|S| = (w+1)^{|\mathcal{N}| \cdot m \cdot (m+1)}$
- Large action space $|\mathcal{A}| = |\mathcal{N}| \cdot (m+1)$
- Non-stationary Environment due to presence of adversary

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
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Our Reinforcement Learning Method

Policy Gradient & Function Approximation


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- π_{θ} parameterized by weights $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$ of NN.
- PPO & REINFORCE (stochastic π)

Auto-Regressive Policy Representation

- ullet To deal with large action space ${\cal A}$
- To minimize interference
- $\pi(a, n|o) = \pi(a|n, o) \cdot \pi(n|o)$

Opponent Pool

- To avoid overfitting
- Want agent to learn a general strategy



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
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
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


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
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Experimentation: Learning from Zero Knowledge



Experimentation: Learning from Zero Knowledge



Conclusion & Future Work

Conclusions:

- We have proposed a Method to automatically find security strategies
- Model as Markov game & evolve strategies using self-play reinforcement learning
- Addressed domain-specific challenges with Auto-regressive policy, opponent pool, and function approximation.
- Challenges of applied reinforcement learning
 - Stable convergence remains a challenge
 - Sample-efficiency is a problem
 - Generalization is a challenge

• Current & Future Work:

- Study techniques for mitigation of identified RL challenges
- Learn security strategies by interacion with a cyber range

Thank you

• All code for reproducing the results is open source:

https://github.com/Limmen/gym-idsgame